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FOREWORD
This is Volume 1 of a four-volume report; Volumes
III and IV will be available after 1 October 1967. This
volume reflects the results of the first six months of
study effort.
The material presented herein was developed under
a Company-funded effort to determine the requirements
and constraints imposed on long-duration, manned space
flights by the potential unreliability of spacecraft sys-
tems, and the need to take corrective action in both the
design stage and during the projected mission. The
study was conducted in conjunction with the Manned
Planetary Flyby Missions Study NAS8-18025 in order to
use the mission and systems designs developed therein.
The study was conducted during the first half of
CFY 1967 by the Systems Engineering Management
Division of the Space and Information Systems Division
of North American Aviation, Inc., under Research
Authorizations (RA) 02195-15400 and 02195-15100.
Documentation of the study is contracted under NAS2-
4214, by the Mission Analysis Division, NASA/OART,
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California
The work was performed under the direction of
Roy B. Carpenter, Jr., the program manager, Advanced
Operations Analysis, Systems Engineering Management.
Substantial contributions were made by H.L. Steverson,
R.F. Wadsworth, L.K. Relyea, E.M. Murad,
J.P. Goggins, J.A. Roebuck and I. Streimer.
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I. BACKGROUND
I. i INTRODUCTION
Because extended, manned, earth orbital and interplanetary flights
pose a challenge to the nation's technological capability.reasonable assurance
of mission success and crew safety is a basic prerequisite to these flights.
It is self-evident that a need exists to create an integrated design and opera-
tional concept that will yield the desired safety assurance, and yet be feasible,
economical, and acceptable to engineering and management. However, the
no-failure-allowed approach to achieving mission assurance is unrealistic
/or the longer manned missions within the 1970-1980 period. Since the
ability to improve mission success has already been demonstrated, the
demand has grown for a long-mission-duration manned spacecraft design that
will make maximum use of both man and machine. Thus it is evident that the
concept should include man as a maintenance expert, a trouble anticipating
sensor, a backup operator, a backup computer, and perhaps other functions
as yet undefined. In sum, such an approach is embodied in the availability
concept.
This concept, originally applied to ground electronic systems, has been
developed under a prior study for application to manned space missions,
under a design and analysis technique deriving an optimum man-machine-
naission relationship. It assures the required operational availability of
spacecraft systena functions while remaining within the constraints imposed
by the crew, equipment, and mission commitmenls. The concept requires
that the crew shall recognize degraded performance, isolate its cause, and
perform the required maintenance action.
The maintenance aspect of the concept has been the subject of several
former studies conducted at S&ID which indicate that man, given adequate
preparation, can probably perform the required activities. Indications are
that the maintenance workload would not exert a pronounced influence on
crew utilization and it appears that the maintenance requirements can be
identified with reasonable accuracy. Uncertainty relating to failure rates
imposes a small weight penalty in increased spares, and its effect appears
to be well below that of the uncertainty in propellant requirements.
The ApOllo spacecraft or its subsystems were not specifically designed
to facilitate in-flight maintenance. But they do represent what may be con-
sidered the 1970 technology. Apollo subsystems were used as the study
i-i
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baseline, as modified by the flyby mission requirement. Cornxnonality of
functions of primary, or crew-sensitive spacecraft systems_ for diverse
missions (planetary, lunar, or orbital) makes it reasonable to assume that
the system components would be similar, if not interchangeable, for a given
time period such as the 1970's or 1980's. In addition, the development
problems associated with new designs for each new mission make such a
philosophy unattractive because of both cost and risk.
The extended-mission Apollo represents the best contemporary source
of detailed system design data upon which to base the proposed study. These
data, in conjunction with the configurations established in the Mars/Venus
Flyby Study (Ref. I. i), provide the basis for the mission and systems for the
planetary mission module. The planetary, lunar landing modules and earth
recovery modules are expected to use the same system components, but the
need for maintainabi!ity is less crucial because of the relatively short duty
cycles. By application of the same reasoning, the Apollo Extension Systems
(Eel. I. Z) form a realistic base for the extended earth-orbital and lunar
missions.
The study was conducted in three phases. Phase I identifies the main-
tenance problem in terms of expected requirements and constraints; Phase II
will include design sensitivity, and the required trade-off analysis; and
Phase II/will analyze the effects on spacecraft design and establish a mission
system description as it applies to the reliability and crew safety problems.
I. Z REQUIR]Eh4ENT FOR MAINTENANCE
S&ID has studied for several years reliability problems associated with
extended manned space travel--a portion of the work being accomplished under
NASA contracts (l_efs. I. I, I. 2, I. 3 and I. 4), and in addition, S&ID, through
company-sponsored studies, has continued these efforts. These, in con-
junction with the Apollo Program and its extension studies, have provided
for the time period of interest a wealth of data on the reliability/crew safety
as_ctsl of manned spacecraft.
As shown in Figure I. I, the data indicates that, during the next decade,
it will be impracticalto attempt design of a spacecraft for maintenance-free
operations for missions in excess of about 45 days. The practical mission
limits for a non-maintainable design for a manned spacecraft probably vary
between 30 to 45 days, depending on the mission profile and objectives. As
missions are extended in duration and the abort profiles become more com-
plex and time consuming, equipment failure becomes virtually certain.
Further, a point is reached where adding redundancy no longer compensates
*A system wherein loss of function would be deleterious to the crew.
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for potential failures, but rather adds to the failure hazard. This technology
limit is created by the need to include switching devices, performance
monitors and voting circuits as well as the connections to the system in
the function reliability assessment. The practical limit seems to be between
one and two additional components in simple redundancy. Maintenance
beyond this point must be considered as a more reasonable alternative.
This study is concerned with mission durations measured in years.
The approximate mission reliability requirements in terms of mean time
before failure (MTBF) without maintenance are:
I. Venus Flyby Z0 to i00 x 104 hours
2. Mars Flyby Z0 to I000 x 104 hours
3. Mars Landing Z0 to 600 x 104 hours
The state-of-the-art capability has been shown (Ref. I. I) to be as
follows :
I. Without redundancy, approximately 0.1 to I. 0 x 104 hours
2. With optimum redundancy, approximately I. 0 to 5.0 x 104 hours.
If no failures are to be tolerated these estimates obviously fall far
short of the expressed requirements, literally by orders of magnitude.
Further, this same study indicated that, on the average, system MTBF can
be improved by factors of between 5 and I0 over any decade. The effect of
applying those systems to the longer space missions are demonstrated in
Figure I. i, where a state-of-art spacecraft is applied to the missions of
interest without programmed maintenance.
Clearly, the longer missions must be prepared for failures. At this
point, some study results have suggested that a possible alternative would
include abort, spacecraft replacement, escape capsules, or rescue. But,
S_LD studies have shown that, for the planetary and most lunar area missions,
none of these will assure crew survival (Eels. I. I, and I. 5). These are
reviewed later in this study report and shown to be ineffective. Conversely,
provision for even the simplest of maintenance provides very startling
results in terms of increases in mission success and crew survival.
For example, the typical state-of-the-art spacecraft MTBF is
estimated to be about 2800 hours. Now, assume that the mission duration is
about 400 hours. Without any repair the probability of mission success (no
failure) is only:
I-4
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400
R=e'_
Z800
= 0. 870
By making provisions for just one repair, reliability, R, is increased to at
least:
O. 933 at the lower boundry
or
0. 990 at the upper boundary,
depending on the assumed distribution, the method of calculation, and how
the provision for the repair was implemented. Adding provisions for one
more repair (in the critical system), or a total of two, raises the lower
boundary estimate for mission reliability, R, to more than 0.99. These
data indicate that providing for maintenance for the longer missions pos-
sesses a very attractive potential for increasing probability of mission
success. Further, this is one case where the mathematics present a very
conservative picture of the actual gains derived. This effect is dramatically
shown in Figure I. 2 which presents an estimate of mission reliability as a
function of mission duration and spares application. The lower curve, the
baseline spacecraft, is representative of the latest AES reliability estimates
derived from Apollo data. The curves above the base spacecraft represent
the effects of adding one spare to the previous state for replacement of a
critical con_ponent in the listed system. Note that a marked effect on mission
reliability is achieved by adding only three spares.
The effects of sparing on the probability of safe return are not as
dran%atic for many earth orbital missions because of the abort capability.
However, for the extended lunar and planetary missions, the results of
M&I_ actions are essentially the same as shown for mission success. This
condition prevails because of the abort criteria applied to the Apollo mis-
sions and the very high initial probability of crew survival. But, as the
n]issions are extended in distance away from the earth, the abort time
delay exercises an increasingly more significant influence on the survival
characteristics of a nonn%aintainable manned spacecraft design.
From the foregoing, it is evident that a few spares and the associated
M&I% actionshave a profound effect on both missions safety and success.
The next most natural question is how many M&R actions are required to
achicve a reasonable level of safety for the missions of interest? This is
1-5
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actually a major subject of the study. However, the number was estimated
in R.ef. 1. 1. Using the prior estimated spacecraft MTBF, the number of
M&I_ actions to be prepared for can be calculated as a function of the risk
to he taken in meeting the need.
Sir_ we are dealing with a statistical problem, the answer will be
statistical in nature; if the mission risk or reliability is to be 0. 95, this
means that a 5-percent risk of not having the required part for a failure
is acceptable. In Figure I. 3, the number of M&P_ actions to be prepared
for has been estimated for the state-of-the-art spacecraft, as a function
of mission duration and acceptable risk. With only a 5-percent risk, less
than 85 M&R actions need be expected. Thus, this adds up to less than one
activity per week of mission time, a very modest workload indeed. A basic
intention of this study is to identify which specific components in a typical
contemporary spacecraft will require attention and in what form.
In the past, maintenance has often been accomplished despite the
design, rather than as a result of designing for maintenance. But now,
crew safety, political, and cost aspects make it mandatory to take advan-
tage of the potential reduction in risk inherent in the maintainable design.
Since in-flight maintenance is dependent, to a large extent, on an amenable
system configuration and hardware, full consideration must be given to the
design for maintenance at the onset of the program. Thus, in-flight main-
tenance becomes an integral part of system design, and requires coordination
with the concerned disciplines such as engineering, reliability, human
factors, maintainability, logistics, and operations analysis. This systems
approach has led to the availability concept detailed in llef. I. 6.
i. 3 THE AVAILABILITY CONCEPT
I. 3. 1 Description
While it is essential that the probability of failures on long space
missions be recognized and accepted, it does not necessarily follow that
they need to be catastrophic. For example, space flights to date have
encountered failures with no crew loss. This factor led S&ID to the develop-
ment and application of the availability concept to the manned planetary
missions in which abort was impractical.
The availability concept is a design or mission analysis technique
that facilitates the determination of an optimum n]an-machine relationship.
Mission effectiveness is maximized through establishment of a safe and
reasonable balance between system and mission perforn_ance, operation
control, reliability, and maintainability. Application of this concept can
result in a design that provides maximum operational availability of the
I-6
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system functions within the constraints imposed by crew capabilities, mission
requirements, and existing technology, thus maximizing the potential mission
success.
Application of this design concept virtually eliminates the usual risk
patterns associated with the reliability design and replaces it with control-
lable parameters, not limited to the state-of-the-art and any given time
period. The resultant risk pattern is demonstrated in Figure 1.4 where the
two design concepts are contrasted. In both concepts, the ordinates i_,
reliability, and A, availability, express the probability of mission success.
Ordinate A is independent of time and is dependent only on maintenance and
the ability to meet the downtime constraints. In the situations portrayed,
the mission time approaches or is in excess of the system MTBF. The longer
the mission duration, the more probable failure becomes. The nonmaintain-
able approach is destined to near-certain failure for the longer missions.
Contrasting this with the availability design, there is no appreciable change
found in the probability of mission success within the mission duration
indicated. Individual system functions may be down for short periods, as
demonstrated subsequently within this report.
1.3. Z Application
The availability concept as an analytical/design tool is presented in
logic form in Figure i. 5. Before application, the system reliability/safety
logic has been prepared in simplified form, with the weak links ":=identified in
order of weakness. Then, starting with the weakest, the analytical logic is
applied to each block (x.x.x i) in sequence, until the safety/success goal is
achieved, or surpassed. A detailed explanation is given in Refs. I. i, and
i. 6 along with sample applications.
The key to the analysis is to determine what level of assembly to work
on, and the most effective/safe corrective action required to reduce a failure
hazard. Each weak link must be treated as an individual case; the most prob-
able failure modes should be isolated, and then appropriate action determined.
Computers can only be used in a bookkeeping role because they are ineffective
at this point.
Selection criteria to be considered include accessibility, least number
of spares per weak link, least number and complexity of repairs per weak
link, ease of maintenance, least redundancy and simple monitoring and
diagnosis. !_edundancy is a less desirable alternative because interchange-
ability of spares is reduced. The process of selecting the level of assembly
for maintenance can have a profound influence on the resulting mission
requirements. To assure maximum mission efficiency, it is necessary to
*Weak Links are the more failure prone components of a system.
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determine how failure risk is distributed within the specific system, functions,
assemblies, or parts. From the example of Figure i. 6, note that one func-
tion displays a low reliability only at the system level. Therefore, one
assembly at this level still contributes most of the failure hazard. However,
at the part level, three assemblies exhibit equal risk of failure. The one
assembly which contains all those parts could be spared, or the three parts
could be spared. Thus, the choice is an obvious one if the spare assembly
is small and lightweight, easy to diagnose, and easy to replace.
1.3.3 Application Requirements and Constraints
To apply these concepts on manned spacecraft and mission design some
requirements and constraints should be imposed. And a basic objective
encompassing this study is to identify and bound them and demonstrate further
the feasibility of long duration manned space ventures. Therefore, these will
be discussed in detail throughout the report.
REQUIREMENTS are imposed by the need to perform the M&Ractions. Some
examples of these are:
lo A spare parts complement - provided to meet the repair and
replacement needs to a risk level compatible with the mission
goals.
A Performance Monitor - designed to facilitate identification
of system malfunctions where they are most likely to occur.
. Diagnostic Equipment - designed to isolate malfunctions in
the potentially weak system functions.
. Tools - selected to aid the crewman in making the M&R action
within the constraints imposed on the crewman and the mission
env ironment.
. Backup Support - support systems and/or redundant systems
necessary to assure performance of critical functions during
the M&R cycles.
. Maintainable systems - designed to facilitate the maintenance
and/or repair of those functions identified as potential weak
links.
I-II
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CONSTRAINTS are imposed on the mission and systems designs which
establish a boundary on some of the design parameters. Some examples of
these are:
. Mission System Downtime Constraints - are restrictions imposed
on the length of time the total system functions. For example, the
velocity correction can be out of service. These are imposed by
mission profile and spacecraft attitude requirements.
2-. Crew System Downtime Constraints - are restrictions imposed on
the length of time a crew system function can be inoperative at any
one time. For example, the CO 2 reduction. These are imposed
by the need to provide the crew with a habitable environment.
. Workman Constraints - are imposed by the physical limitations of
man performing a given activity within a specific environment.
1.4 BACKGROUND REFERENCE
Reference No. Title and Source
i.I Manual Mars and/or Venus Flyby Study,
NAS9-3499, SID 65-761-5, June, 1965.
1.2 Preliminary Definition Phase, Apollo
Extension Systems, SID 65-1547,
16 December 1965.
1.3 Manual Mars Mission Module Study, NAA/
S&ID SID 64-1, January, 1964.
1.4 Radio Isotope Dynamic Electrical Power
System Study for Manned Mars/Venus
Mission, NAS9-3520, NAA/AI,
19 February 1965.
1.5 Space Rescue and Escape, SID 66-1341,
NAA/S&ID, September, 1966.
1.6 A Proposal for Availability Extension Studies
as a Means of Extending the Useful Life of the
Apollo Spacecraft, SID 66-10, NAA/S&ID,
17 January 1966.
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II. MISSION REQUIREMENTS
2. 1 MISSION OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS
This study was conducted in close coordination with the NAA/S&ID
Study of Manned Planetary Flyby Missions conducted under contract
NAS8-180Z5 to NASA/MSFC, Ref. 1. 1. Since the objective of this study is
the demonstration of the feasibility of safe, long-duration manned space
flight, it seemed reasonable to apply it to a mission of primary interest.
For that reason, much of the data developed under the NASA contract pro-
vided guidance for this study.
Mission requirements and the associated design considerations evolve
from the desire to achieve a given objective. For purposes of this study,
the objective is to identify the factors which affect the probability of safe
return of a manned mission designed to fly by the planet Mars; and to
identify the combination of mission and vehicle design concept that will
assure the highest probability of safe return.
This study is concerned with the safety and success aspects of the
mission, to the exclusion of systems design. However, it is impractical
to attempt to separate these considerations completely. To avoid a design
study per se, the design alternatives identified in the referenced NASA
study will be used as a baseline, and other design alternatives will be con-
sidered only when necessary to provide the desired mission success
as surance.
Mission success and safety is dependent on both the mission profile
and the mission systems. The more complex the mission profile and the
individual phases, the lower the chances of success. Also, the longer the
mission, the more difficult the mission assurance problem becomes. This
may be seen from the basic reliability, R, equation:
[ kl
R=e tl+ kztz+.'.+ knt n
whe r e:
t = phase duration
k = (f) phase complexity (because the support systems are more complex)
n = mission phase
Z-1
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This becomes even more obvious when a comparison is made between
the landing mission and the flyby missions as shown in Figure 2. i. For the
longer missions note that at least 38 discrete and major operations exist,
n_any of which are time critical. Yet, for the flyby missions, there are
only 16, nlost of which are not time critical. This relationship will be
explored in detail later in the report.
Several potential n_issions were identified in the referenced study as
potential candidates for the time period of interest. They vary considerably
in duration and character, as a function of both planet objective and time of
departure. These are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The missions do display
luany features in COlUmon, specifically in the profile functions. For that
reason, selecting a representative baseline n_ission for theremainder of this
study will not compronlise its usefullness, particularly if the baseline is
nearly a "worse case. "
2. 2 THE BASELINE MISSIONS AND SPACECRAFT
Since mission success and safety are sensitive to the n_ission profile
characteristics, it is essential to this study to identify a recommended
profile. Further, since these objectives are also sensitive to the required
functions and associated equipnlent, it is equally necessary to identify those
functions that are essential to each nlission phase or portion thereof.
For the purposes of this study, a representative nlanned Mars flyby
mission was selected as the baseline nxission, as a result of consultation
with the NASA study team. The following are sonxe of its basic character-
istics, which will be detailed in functional flow analysis to follow:
Departure date 1977
Total duration 690 days or 16, 560 hours
Outbound leg 140 days or 3360 hours
1Zetu rn leg 530 days or 12,720 hours
Planetary vicinity 20 days or 480 hours
For additional details see the NAS8-18025 report.
The baseline spacecraft comes from the sanle source and is shown
in Figure 2. 3. The subsystenls are Apollo derivatives, where applicable.
Where this was not practical the con_ponents were used to n_ake up the new
subsystems. The details are given later in this report. The baseline space-
craft layout is as shown in Figure 2.4 and was derived frmrl Ref. I. l, 1.2
and 2. I.
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3"7"181 i
J
]----_' 3.7.12
Block
No.
3.7
3.7.1
3.7.2
3.7.3
3.7.4
3.7.5
3.7.6
3.7.7
3.7.8
3.7.9
3.7.10
3.7.11
3.7.12
3.7.13
3.7.14
3.7.15
3.7.16
3.7.17
3.7.18
3.8
!
• 3.7.16 F [
LI
! Duration
_i in flours
Perform Transplanetary Leg Operations / 3360.00
Determine Trajectory Parameters
Trajectory Data with Earth Com_utedData _0.5Compare
ApplyZ3V Correction i J
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters
Perform a Complete S-C Checkout i _ 0.5
Prepare for the Artificial Gravity Modb fl
E i
xtend S/C, Achieve 1/5 Gravity and Stabilize 0.5
Transplanetary Coast (lst Phase) * _ 1678
]
Accept and Apply Earth Computed Trajectory Data L. O 2
Determine the need for Trajectory Correction It[_f
Retract S/C and return to 0 "G" Mode .- i 0.5
Apply _ V for Midcourse Correction i_ ._ ^
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters i _ 0.5
Same as 3 .... i i 0.5
Same as.3.7 i 0 5
Same as 3.8 (2nd Phase) * i ! 1678
Same as 3.9 I ;
Perform Interplanetary Experiment Program i_3300.00
Perform Planetary Approach Operations
I
* For details, see Third Level Functional Flow,
Interplanetary Coast Phase
Figure 2.7. Second-Level Functional Flow,
Leg Operations
Z-II,Z-IZ
_3.?.14 P"
3.7 Preform Transplanetary
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E3.
Block
No.
3.8
3,8,1
3.8.2
3.8.3
3.8.4
3,8.5
3.8.6
3.8.7
3.8.8
3.9
Function
..... , ..... , .... p ,
Perform Planetary Approach Operations
Prepare to Return to Zero "G" Hode
Accept 5 Insert Earth Computed Trajectory t_ata
Return to Zero "G" Hode (as indicated by 3.8.2)
Perform Spacecraft Stability Control Functions
Calculate Trajectory Change Required andA V
Apply 4 V Correction (as required)
Recalculate Trajectory
Continue Planetary Approach Coast
Perform Planetary Encounter Operations
Duration
in liours
_20.00
(,. 5
_t20.O0
18.5
Figure Z. 8. Second- Level Functional Flow,
Approach Operations
3.8 Preform Planetary
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Block
No.
3.9
5.9.1
3.9.2
3.9.3
3.9.4
3.9.5
3.9.6
3.9.7
3.9.8
3.9.9
3.9.10
3.9.11
3.9.12
3.9.13
3.9.14
3.9.15
3.9.16
3.9.17
3.10
__l_ 3.9.2 I (Continued from 3.8.4)
_4 3.6.4 _ Continuing3.6.10 Spacecraft
3.6.11 Functions
Function
Perform Planetary Encounter Operations
Prepare Encounter Support Systems
Perform Spacecraft Attitude Control Function
Prepare Planetary Scientific Equipment
Initiate Optical Sensor Functions
Perform Lander Probe Deployment Functions
Initiate Photographic Sensor Functions
Confirm Lander Probe Trajectory
Istablish Communications with Lander Probe
Perform Lander Probe Tracking and Control Functions
Perform Lander Probe Data Storage and Relay Function
Perform Orbital Probe Insertion(s) Functions
Perform Orbital Probe Tracking and Control Function
Establish Orbital Probe to Spacecraft Communications
Perform Orbital Probe Data Storage and Relay Functim
Perform Encounter Scientific Experiments (others)
Relay Data to Earth Control
Terminate Planetary Encounter Experiments
Perform Transearth Operations
_uz F_
NORTH AMERICAN
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AVATONNcSt'.ACF] and INF()HM..vrI()N _'*'_TF].%I.'4 DIVI,'glON
3.9.11
Duration
in Hpurs
460.00
0.5
460.00
2.0
1.0
240.0
240.0
120.0
1.0
6.0
200
200
460
460.0
Figure 2.9. Second-Level Functional Flow, 3.9 Preform Planetary
Encounter Opera.tions
) 2-I 5, Z-16
SID _-478- 1
_'o_a)ouz
._ 3.9.2 i ,,
E3.10.._,__
I_3.16"n qJ
i
.Continuous
Spacecraft
Support
Functions
Block
No.
3.10
3.10.1
3.10.2
3.10.3
3.10.4
3.10.5
3.10.6
3.10.?
3.10.8
3.10.9
3.10.10
3.10.11
3.10.12
3.10.13
3.10.14
3.10.1S
3.10.16
3.10.17
3.10.18
3.10.19
3.11
n,i i.i • i ii • Ill II.Iml I m
[;unction
Perform Transearth Operations
Determine Trajectory Parameters
Compare Trajectory Data with Earth Computed Data
Apply1'kV Correction
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters
Perform a Complete Spacecraft Status Check
Prepare for _rtificial Gravity Mode (Includes Ma
Extend Spacecraft, Achieve 1/3 "G" and Stabalize
Transearth Coast (1st Phase}*
Perform Transearth Experiment Program
Accept and Api)ly Earth Computed Trajectory Data
Determine Nee,l for Trajectory Correction
Retract Spacecraft and Return to Zero "G" Mode
Apply_V for Midcourse Correction
Recalculate Trajectory Parameters
Samu as 3.10.6
Same as 3.1C.7
Transearth Coast (2nd Phase)*
Same as 3.1(_.10
Initiate Earth Approach Experiment Program
Perform Earth Approach Operations
J
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3.10.ill
i
3.10.18 3.10.17 3.10.14
Ltenance)
Duration
12,700.0
" 0.5
_0.5
0.5
6,348.5
12,690.0
0.5
l 0.5
0.5
0.5
6,348.0
as rsquirod
( unk )
Figure Z. I0. Second-Level Functional Flow,
Transearth Operations
Z- 17,2 -18
3. 10 Preform
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.,,¢..,._. of mission
I_i 3.6.4 I Continuing e-----_ ___-.----
i ;
_ 3:_6._II_J Functions _.Ii.9_
r i u
Continuous throughout remai::der
Block Duration
No. Function in ltours
3.11
3.11.1
3.11.2
3.11.3
3.11.4
3.11.5
3.11.6
3.11.7
5.11.8
3.11.9
3.12
Perform Earth Approach Operations
Prepare to return to Zero "C" mode
Accept and Insert l-arth Computed Trajectory Data
Return to Zero "G" Hode
Perform Spacecraft Attitude Control Functions
Determine Trajectory Change and ZkV required
Apply A V Correction (as required)
Continue Earth Approach Coast
Terminate t_xperiment Program
Check out and Haintain All Entry Critical Functions
Perform Earth Retro Operations
20. O0
0.S
20.0
0.S
18.5
unk
Figure 2.11. Second-Level Functional Flow, 3. 1 i Preform
Earth Approach Operation8
2-19
SID 67-478- I
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. _ _PACE and lNFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
3.1
----_.X.X_
d_ ,3.12.1 _'-'-'_3.12.3
--_3.12.2 i
Co .noe 
| 3.6.10 | _Spacecraft
l, 3.6.12 _ I Support
Ltll.4._ Functi°ns
,,,,,,
U3 iC_i 3.1,.7
Block
No.
3.12
3.12.1
3.12. 2
3.12.3
3.12.4
3.12.5
5.12.6
3.12.7
5.15
Function
Perform Earth Retro Operations
Determine Spacecraft Position and Velocity
Accept and Insert Earth Computed Data
Orient Spacecraft along Earth Entry Vector
Apply Retro Power to Burn-out
Reorient Spacecraft for Jettison Operation
Jettison Retro Vehicle
Continue Coast to Earth Entry
Perform Earth Entry Operations
Du rat ion
in Hours
0.5
Figure 2. 12. Second-Level Functional Flow, 3. IZ Preform
Earth Retro Operationl
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t ....
/
If
* See Fourth Level FF
Duration - ltours
Block Trans - Trans -
No, Function Mars Earth
Perform Transplanetary or Trans-Earth Functions3.X.X.
3.x.l Maintain Artificial "G"
3.x.2 Maintain Wobble Damping
3.x.3 Precess Spacecraft Spin Axis to maintain
Desired Orientation
3.x.4 Provide Electrical Power for Experiments
3.x.S Conduct Interplanetary Experiments
3.x.6 Maintain Communications with Earth
3.x.7 Store and Transmit Data to Earth
3.x.8 Monitor System Performance
3.x.9 System Function Failure
3.x.10 Perform Required Maintenance Action
3.x.ll Test and Restore Normal Operation
3.x.12 Switch to a Redundant Fjnction
3.x.13 Continue Normal Operation
3.x.14 [ Provide tlabitable Environment conducive
l to Extended _lissions
3.x.lS _ Prepare to Return to Zero "G" Mode
3.x+l [ Conduct Next Phase Operations
1680 6360
tl
|1
It
t,
1680 6560
/ /
#
Figure 2.13. Third-Level Functional Flow, 3.X.X. Preform Tranmpl&netary
or Transearth Functiona, 1/Z-Cycle
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2.3 MISSION FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
Since the advent of the systems engineering approach, functional flow
logic has been used as a means of identifying system function requirements
and interfaces. This technique has been applied to the flyby mission herein;
however, details were only investigated for those mission phases starting
with, and subsequent to Transplanetary Injection. Refer to Figure Z. 5, the
top-level functional flow diagram, and note that the phases of interest are
those starting with step 3.6 and those following.
The mission phases prior to transplanetary injection are not pertinent
to this study because of the inherent capability to abort from earth orbit
at almost any time, and the very low likelihood of this event.
Figures Z. 6 through Z. 17 are the second-level functional flow diagrams
for the baseline mission, but, in terms of time, they represent less than
5 percent of the total mission time. Figure Z. 13 presents the third level for
the long transearth and transplanetary phases where the major reliability
problem will exist.
Z. 4 MISSION SYSTEM FUNCTION DUTY CYCLES
2.4. 1 The Importance of Duty-Cycle Estimates
At best, duty cycle estimates are difficult to derive, even when there
is a well-defined mission and implementing program. The intent is to deter-
mine the points during a mission, the system functions used, and the duration
of these use periods. In essence, it requires conducting a simulated mission
even before the mission system is designed.
Should the question arise as to why this is necessary, the requirement
becomes self-evident from a reliability requirements analysis standpoint.
Mission reliability (R) is expressed as:
t
MTBF
R=e
where:
t = Duty cycle (time)
MTBF = Mean time before failure
Z'22
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It is evident from this that the more a system function is used (or
required) the higher the MTBF must be to hold i_ constant and assure a
successful mission. Further, a few simple calculations will reveal that the
MTBF must be at least three times as great as its expected duty cycle, so
as to provide even a reasonable probability of success. But even that is not
good enough for missions where abort is impractical.
Available data indicates that many contemporary system components
cannot meet the long MTBF/Life requirements imposed by the Flyby Mission;
others are marginal. Therefore it is necessary to design a mission which
minimizes the demands on a system, and further, to identify as accurately
as possible what these demands will be. An error in the duty-cycle estin_ate
of a factor of only 2 could increase the risk from five losses in one hundred
(0.95) to ten in one hundred (0.9), thus doubling the risk. This must be
reflected in a need for increased redundancy and/or spares and maintenance
ope rations.
Z. 4. Z Approach to Duty-Cycle Estimates
Since it has been established that the duty-cycle estimates are sensitive
design criteria, assume that the method of derivation is also sensitive. A
detailed time-line analysis was therefore performed to derive accurately the
required values. The mission was simulated on a phase-by-phase basis,
and each mission activity, as derived from the functional flow analysis, was
evaluated for the individual function operational requiren_ents. Available
power and crew activities provided useful constraints to bound the probable
values. The mission phase and selected mode of operation also provided
useful boundary values. For example, the decision to use an artificial
gravity mode for the long transplanetary/transearth phases eliminated the
need for stability control, navigation sightings, and reaction control during
this phase. Where there was some doubt as to a requirement, it was
assumed to be required. For example, no midcourse correction n_ay be
required after the initial vector adjustment and before planetary approach.
Therefore, the spin mode would continue, saving fuel and reducing the
overall risk. However, the worse case was assun_ed.
2.4.3 Manned Mars Flyby Duty-Cycle Estimates
The systelu function duty cycles were estimated in conjunction with the
mission planners and subsystem designers. The results are presented in
Table 2. l, Parts 1 through Part 3. The values are expressed in hours,
as a function of the appropriate mission phase, except where noted. The
total system function duty cycle is given in the last column.
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Note that these estimates are normally the maximum expected require-
ments. Any out-of-service time resulting from maintenance can reduce many
of these totals without undue penalties on the crew or mission.
The block numbers at the column heads correspond to the associated
function on the functional flow diagrams. To facilitate a more accurate
estimate of the transearth/transplanet phase requirements, function 3.7
and 3. i0, these were expanded on Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
2.5 MISSION SUCCESS CRITEP_IA AND CKEW SAFETY ASSUKANCE
2.5. 1 Providing Crew Safety Assurance
Crew safety assurance is an intangible result of a complete program
which has taken into account all of the contributing factors. Through a
logical process of design, development, and tests, the program has produced
data which, when presented in concert, demonstrated a reasonable probability
of safe return for the crew. In this context, it is concerned with the crew
only. Five basic alternatives, open to assure space mission crew survival,
follow below:
i. Provide high reliability
2. Provide for local action in the event of failure
3. Provide for a means of safe abort
4. Provide for a means of escape
5' Provide for a rescue mission
Each of these alternatives can be used under certain conditions; but
none are expected to fit all situations. To determine the usefulness of
these alternatives for the Mars Flyby Mission, each was analyzed and the
results presented in the following. In the report, those alternatives which
show promise are investigated in detail.
A high reliability design is one in which no failures will occur through-
out the mission resulting in immediate or eventual loss of the crew. Former
studies(1) have shown this goal to be impractical for the next decade. State-
of-the-art reliabilities average between 0. 1 and 5.0 times 104 hours, MTBF,
even using optimum redundancy. The average Mars Mission requirement is
between 20 and I000 times 104 hours, MTBF. Obviously then, the deficit
is too high to risk the mission without preparation for failure.
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These same studies demonstrated that, although failures will occur,
there may not be very many and a modest maintenance plan will probably
solve the problem.
Local Actions (Maintenance and Repair) is the basic subject of this
study and has shown promise as a solution to the crew safety assurance
problems.
Escape is a form of self-help, where the crew is provided a means
of leaving the parent vehicle and returning to earth via some secondary
vehicle. This technique is impractical because of the severe design require-
ments, if used for any planetary mission, after injection into the transplan-
etary. Such action would require a completely redundant spacecraft, as
will become evident from the abort analysis.
Rescue, as an alternative for enhancing interplanetary mission crew
survival, may at first seem a possibility. But, after a careful review of
the timing problem, it must also be discarded. If a relief vehicle were on
the pad and ready for launch, the elapsed time to rendezvous could easily
exceed the time for the mission vehicle to return to earth. This does not
consider launch windows or the relative velocities of either the vehicles or
earth at return.
A special case of this approach, in terms of a simultaneous launch,
does hold promise, but it may be impractical. Here, two vehicles travel
together, each with the capability of supporting all crew members. This
mission concept is bound to be wasteful because it would complicate launch
operations and extend the earth orbital support activity by up to seventy (70)
days. (2)
Mission abort capability implies that, in the event of a critical failure,
the mission would be terminated and the crew returned home by the most
expedient course. In the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs, substan-
tial gains in safety can be realized through this course of action - it amounts
to over an order-of-magnitude improvement for the Apollo. However, such
a course of action depends on the ability of the spacecraft to perform the
required maneuver which is known to vary drastically with mission phase.
The mission abort capability must be assessed on a phase-by-phase basis.
Abort performed at any time from pad operations through the earth
orbital phases can proceed under the same ground rules applied to the Apollo
mission, and with approximately the same effect on crew safety.
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But abort performed after transplanetary injection is quite another
story. During the injection phase, and, as long as the vehicle velocity (V)
is less than the escape Velocity (Ve), a ballistic reentry from orbit is
possible. However, when V >Ve, then abort propulsion is required to
reduce V to a point where the vehicle may be recaptured by the earth's
gravitational field. The abort problem geometry is given in Figure Z. 14
fronl which it n_ay be seen that, as the departing velocity vector Vo increases,
tile required abort velocity increment increases until the point is rapidly
reached where abort becon_es impractical. See Reference 2. 1 for a detailed
analys is.
Figure 2. 15 presents the abort capability requirement for the first hour
or nlore of tl_e n_ission after injection, and Figure 2.16 shows the picture for
tlle remainder of the mission. These data indicate that abort is impractical
after approximately the first hour and until about 60 days after injection.
Even after 60 days, a significant amount of fuel is required to initiate abort.
And further, the return-leg duration represents a significant proportion of
the total mission duration; it amounts to between 60 to 80 percent of the
balance. In all probability it is assunled that if they can survive then, they
might as well finish the remainder of the mission.
2. 5. 2 Enlergency Nature and Causations
Some planetary design concepts have included great penalties to pro-
vide an abort capability for those first few minutes, and/or despite the
long return trips associated with the latter aborts. The question of concern
]here is, "are the capabilities worth the weight/cost penalties inv01ved?"
To establish value, it nlust be shown that the best abort capability is
present when it is nlost likely to be required or, at the least, the requirement
and capability should be proportional. An exanxination of the emergency
causations indicate that systen_s failures will probably create most of the
emergencies requiring a con_pensating action. Since the likelihood of a
system failure (emergency) is tinge dependent, i.e.,
probability of a failure = l - e
-t
MTBF
the further into the n_ission, the more likely it is that a failure will arise.
This indicates than an abort capability during the first few minutes is far
less necessary than later on. However, since the return leg of the later
aborts is so long, abort is considered inlpractical for the Mars Flyby
n_is sions.
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Figure 2. 16. Post-Planetary Injection, Abort Problem Geometr\"
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2.6 MISSION SUCCESS VERSUS CREW SAFETY FOR THE PLANETARY
MISSIONS
2.6. l The Problem Description
Historically, mission success is a descriptor used to indicate the
probability of a mission meeting a set of prescribed objectives without
failure. Equally historical is the long list of space "failures" listed as
successful. For example, all of the Mercury and Gemini flights encountered
failures of some form. Thus, by definition, mission success was not
achieved, yet, no one would call any of these flights an actual failure. Why
the paradox? The answer is in the definition of "mission success." To be
classified as a success, a mission must have completed the mission plan
without compromising any of the individual objectives. Loosely interpreted,
this means no system failures are allowed.
Of course, this is a rather impractical way of viewing the results and
leads to a lack of understanding of reliability terminology. To clarify this
situation and to as sure a reasonable level of safety in the manned planetary
missions, a different approach is proposed for this study.
2.6. 2 Definition of Terms
Three terms are proposed, the -Probability of Safe Return (PR),
Missions Systems Availability (A) and Mission Success (i°s):
The Probability of Safe Return (PR) expresses a crew's chance to
return safely to earth after injection into the transplanetary phase. It does
not necessarily imply that all the systems supporting the crew or the mis-
sion functioned throughout the mission. It is possible that many systems
and functions can be out of order and yet return the crew safely to earth.
For example, even though artificial gravity may be desirable and indeed
mandatory for good physical health, the mission can return safely without
that mode in an emergency. The same is true of such functions as commu-
nications, for it may be desirable for good mental health and to provide data
transferred channels, but the crew could return safely without it.
Mission systems availability (A) expresses the chance the mission will
progress as planned and the mission systems will meet the planned profile
cor_mitments. The definition excludes only those functions specifically
associated with the scientific investigations. Availability includes the effects
of maintenance and repair provided that these activities are accomplished
within any governing constraints. The availability concept allows for failures
and takes them into account in the design activities. To meet the availability
g(Jal, all mission systems must function properly for the expressed percen-
tage of mission time.
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Mission success (Ps) is used in a semi-conventional sense, because it
is associated with all the mission goals and expresses the percentage of
scientific objectives accomplished with respect to those planned. Using the
term in this manner provides for a more meaningful expression of mission
accomplishment. Applications of this latter class is beyond the scope of
this study and, in fact, would be meaningless apart from a specifically
defined mission wherein all of the scientific objectives were clearly defined.
2.6.3 Applying the Definitions - A Criticality Concept
Definitions of applicable mission system objectives have been provided,
each expressed in terms of a probability of accomplishment and/or a per-
centage. These definitions provide a framework for generating the associated
reliability logic diagram. These, in turn, permit an assessment of the
problems associated with meeting the respective objectives. To facilitate the
selection of those functions and associated components which are required to
meet these mission objectives, a system of classification has been devised
that will be used to identify the functions and components with the specific
mission objectives. The classification is based on the criticality of the
function. Therefore, it follows that,
Criticality I applies to those functions and components associated with
meeting the safe return objective (PR)
Criticality II applies to those functions and components not required
to achieve PR, but are required to achieve the mission systems
availability goal (A)
Criticality III applies to those functions associated with obtaining and
processing the scientific data, and are not required for the first two
classes. (Note that this class will not be considered in this study. )
To facilitate an understanding of the application of criticality classes,
Table 2.4 is provided at the system level. However, it should be noted that
not all functions within the system belong within any one class.
Z. 6.4 Selecting Mission Goals
Establishing a set of mission goals for each of the identified success
objectives has always been an arbitrary operation where the criteria used
was clouded with emotion, and perhaps somewhat divorced from logic.
During this study, an investigation of the risk picture for various occupa-
tions is summarized. The insurance con_pany actuarialists were consulted
and U.S. Air Force data was researched to determine what might be con-
sidered a "reasonable risk" for programs of this type. (See references Z. Z
and 2.3. )
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Figure 2. 17 presents estimates of mortality rates for three careers
that might be considered analoguous to the astronaut. In summary, it
indicates that the mortality rate or occupational hazard for these classes of
careers is in excess of i0 per thousand, per year. In short, there is one
chance in one hundred that they will not survive the year. In these figures,
age was not considered a factor.
Table Z. 4. Mars Flyby Systen_ Criticality Assignments
Systenl
1. Envi r omnental
control
Life (habita-
bility support)
3. Stability
control
4. Guidance
5. Navigation
6. Couul_unications
7. Propulsion
8. Spin control
9. Data systen_s
10. Space suits
II. Electrical power
Criticality
Class
II*
III
II*
I
II
II
Associated
Obj e ctive
P
R
PR
PR
P
R
A
A
PR
A
P
s
A
P
R
Application Remarks
Some equipment cooling
excluded
Personnel hygiene
items excluded
Applies during zero-g
phase only
Sonde subsystems may
be in II
Earth backup possible
and prin_ary
Data systen-_s excluded
Required for artificial g
only
Required for scientific
data only
May be required for
n_aintenanc e
Only part of the system
':: ()ILL' or the other rcqtdrcd for P
R
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Now, refer to Figure 2. 18 where the n_ortality rates are plotted as a
function of mission duration and age, at the time a mission was to start.
These were plotted using data from deaths from all causes and career types.
The data indicates that the hazard length to the Mars Flyby mission would
be for a departing age of:
i. 35 yrs old, 55 per i000 Missions.
2. 30 yrs old, 43 per i000 Missions.
3. 25 yrs old, 31 per I000 Missions.
The higher risk factors associated with such "safe" occupations as the
airline pilot or even the flying business man raises the average risk levels
to between 31 and 55 deaths per thousand missions, dependirg on the
departing age. Since most astronauts are in the 30- to 35-year ranges, use
of a risk near the upper limit would not be incongruous. One additional
consideration is pertinent - crew size. If a four-man crew is involved,
these figures must be multiplied by a factor of four; or, if the crew is
larger, a factor equal to the crew size must be used to express the total
probability of a death during a period equivalent to the mission duration.
Here it is assumed that the normal occupation of the crewnlen was that of
an Air Force or airline pilot.
By applying these actuarial data to determine survival probability of
the four-man crew for a period equivalent to the Mars Flyby mission, it is
estimated that this risk could be as high as Z out of 10. This amounts to a
probability of safe return for the total four-man crew of as low as PR = 0.8.
Thus, with these data as a background, the basic premise is that an
astronaut should be willing to accept a mission risk not greater than that
associated with his normal occupation, but should not be asked to accept
a risk greater than the individual crew member. In this n_anner, a realistic
goal can be set for the various mission objectives, and proposed as follows:
i. Probability of Safe Return (PR) >_ 0.99
2. Mission System Availability >- 0.95
3. Mission Success >-0.90
It should also be noted that these goals are compatible with those
applied to contemporary manned space progranls. Henceforth, these will
form the basis for the requirements analysis. The n_ission systems will be
analyzed and defined to the extent necessary to assure at least these levels
of risk.
2-38
SID 67 -478-I
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. SPACE and INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
2.7 MISSION REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES
Ref. No. Title and Source
2.1 Manned Planetary Flyby Mission Based on Saturn/Apollo Systems,
NAS8-18025, NAA/S&ID, SID 67-110 et al.
2.2 Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1962- 1963 Edition.
2.3 Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, Vol. 1963, No. 2,
pages 60 and 65.
2.4 Mortality by Industry and Cause of Death Among Men, 20 to
64 Years of Age. USA, 1950. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Vol. 53, No. 4, September, 1963.
2.5 Accident Rates and Fatalities, U.S. Certified Route and
Supplemental Air Carriers, Total Operations 1949 - 1963,
CAB Bureau of Safety, August, 1964.
2-39
SID 67-478- 1
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. SPACE and INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
III. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (M&R) CONSTRAINTS
3. 1 CONSTRAINTS CAUSATIONS
Given that failures and other types of emergencies will occur during
long space missions, and that the mission duration is significantly long
enough to require restoration of the lost function, all constraining factors
must be properly identified and bounded. The constraints stem from an
analysis of the functional flow logic required to accomplish the mission and
perform the given task. Therefore, the resulting constraints may be
classified by these sources.
The first class of constraints are imposed by the need for the function
to assure mission success and/or to maintain life. These are termed down-
time constraints, or maintenance time constraints (MTC). An example is
the CO2 removal function which may be said to be out of service on a typical
planetary spacecraft for no more than 36.7 hours. Therefore, its MTC is
36. 7 hours. This means simply that if the complete function fails, it must be
returned to service within that time period to avoid disaster. In this case,
loss of crew.
The second class of constraints are imposed by man's inability to cope
with the emergency (by M&R action) as they occur and under the prevailing
circumstances. For example, if the spacecraft is tumbling at a fast rate,
the crew could do very little until it was stopped or slowed down. These are
termed crew action constraints (CAC) since they describe the man-imposed
constraints. These factors are evaluated in Section 4.0.
Each of these classes are explored in detail in the following paragraphs.
3.2 DEFINITIONS
The most critical problem created by a failure is the loss of the
associated function it provides to the mission. Maintenance or repair action
is effective only so long as the mission can continue safely without the func-
tion, or if a backup function (or system) is available for use during the repair
action. It is logical to assume that the function is required during some
specific part of the mission, or a percentage of the total duration, randomly
distributed throughout the mission. It is also just as logical to assume that
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the n_ission can proceed in a degraded mode and perhaps only for a very short
period of time. If this is true, that period can be used for both periodic
maintenance and the necessary repair or replacement actions. The downtime
constraint is therefore defined as:
A restriction imposed on the total allowable elapsed time
a mission system function can be out of service before a
situation is created that would result in ultimate loss of
the mission spacecraft and/or crew.
It should be recognized that downtime constraints are not always
described by a single value defining an all-black or all-white situation. Crew
or function degradation may be gradual as in the case of CO 2 buildup, or,
almost instantaneous, as would be the case at rapid decompression.
System functional downtime constraints are inaposed by two separable
mission design factors; the need to provide a habitable environment, and the
need to meet the nlission profile conan_itments. There is an obvious inter-
face between sonde of these factors, but where they exist, the most stringent
factor will be assessed and subsequently applied to the mission system
design.
3.3 SPACECRAFT STABILITY OR AN ATTITUDE CONTROL
A profile constraint is created by both n_ission commitments because
a stable and orientable platforn_ is needed for navigation, guidance, and con-
duct of experiments; and because crew personnel are limited in their ability
to tolerate random and repetitive motion.
The attitude control systems can fail in these n_odes:
A. Under Zero-g Phases:
i. Loss of the ability to activate the system or any part thereof,
resulting in rand.n] drift.
Failure of engine control - resulting in a runaway engine and
an accelerating spin creating naotion in at least one plane.
. Failure of the engine nozzle (burnthrough), resulting in vector
mi sal igrm-_e nt.
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B. Under Artificial Gravity Phases:
I. Loss of ability to activate spin system results in loss of
ability to change the spacecraft state; i. e. , go from artificial
gravity to zero g , or from zero g to the artificial
gravity mode.
2. Failure of engine control resulting in a higher g-level than
that desired for the artificial g-mode - probably not excessive
due to fuel restraints.
1 Runaway precession engine is most likely only during the
artificial gravity mode. This will result in changing the
spacecraft spin-axis vector by up to two degrees, as a maxi-
mum, prior to running out of fuel.
The failure modes have been evaluated to determine the potential down-
time constraints associated with these function failures. These are given in
Table 3. l, but some explanation as to the meaning and application is
required. Since the spacecraft is expected to be operated in two basic mocks
with respect to control system problems under zero g and with artificial
gravity, the associated control system emergencies will be quite different.
3. 3. 1 Under zero g
The spacecraft must maintain a given attitude through use of a stable
platform, as a reference, and as a reaction control system for repositioning
or stopping motion. The system must work constantly throughout the mission
to prevent random drift. The tighter the "dead band;' the more it works.
Loss of the system function leaves the spacecraft with an unchanged course
vector, but uncontrolled in attitude. It could remain in this condition without
serious effects for a considerable portion of a mission, but communications,
the heat shield, and reentry or aerobraking heat rejection capabilities may
eventually be affected. It is considered probable that the spacecraft would
eventually "weather-vane" into the solar winds and remain semistable.
If one of the reaction control jets failed, the roll rate would build up as
indicated in Figure 3. I, the rate varying according to the axis involved; the
axis of summetry being the "worst case." If it continued unimpeded, it wo_fld
eventually run out of fuel, as indicated by the "tankage limits. " This would
occur after no more than 900 seconds of burning time, and much sooner if the
failure occurred late in the mission. If all of the possible resultants were
plotted on the crew tolerance flat plot taken from Reference 3. l, the results
would be as expressed in Figure 3.2. This analysis indicates that the crew
can tolerate for an indefinite period any potential rational rate, possibly
resulting from an open reaction jet on the baseline spacecraft. This has been
substantiated by considerable test data from Reference 3.2.
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Table 3. 1. Downtime Constraints, Spacecraft Attitude, and
Stability Control Operations
System Function/Mode
A-1. Zero g, no
stability control
A-2. Zero g,
Runaway reaction
engine
A-3. Zero g, no
spin control
B-I. Zero g, no
spin control
B-I. Spin mode
no de-spin control
B-2. Runaway spin
engine
B-3. Runaway pre-
cession motor
Maximum Allowable
Downtime (hour s)
over 24
At least 0.2 hours
to neutralize; over
24 hours for M&R
Over 24 hours
Over 24 hours -
probably none
Over 24 hours ,
normally
3.6 to over
24 hour s
None
Constraining Factor s
Loss of communications and
heating balance. Random
drift with astronaut move-
ment and/or alignment with
solar winds
Physiological limits and
his subsequent inability to
perform useful work
Uses more fuel and creates
a use hazard
Unable to establish arti-
ficial gravity mode, a
per sonnel-impo sed
constraint
Time remaining to the
required de-spin action,
i.e., planetary or earth-
approach phase
Extension system design
strength could be exceeded
if it occurred early in the
mission and the full fuel
load was expended
Full fuel load will permit
only a very small attitude
change
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Figure 3.1.
DEGREES
(SEC)
40O
300
200
100
PROPOSED TANK LIMIT
RPM
_0.3 HR EXPOSURE LIMIT m___I
UNLIMITED
EXPOSURE .... J___ 50
TOLERABLE J
I Jl
AXIS OF XJ
. 25
O0 200 400 800 1000
BURNING TIME (SEC)
Spacecraft Rotation Rate as a Function of Reaction Engine on
Time, With the Resulting Time Constraints
RPM
150 1
100 DEMONSTRATED SAFE
EXPOSURE LIMIT
Figure 3. Z.
5O
0
ROBABLE RANGE _"/'_
OF EX POS UR E////A
i
0 400 800 1200
EXPOSURE TIME (SEC)
Crew Tolerance to Rotations and Potential Expolure for the
Baleline Spacecraft ..
3-5
SID 67-478- 1
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. _,_ SPACE and lNFORMATION SYSTERIS DIVISION
3. 3.2 Under Artificial Gravity Mode
In this condition, the spacecraft will be extended and rotating, pro-
ducing about one-third of the force of the earth's gravitational field. Under
these conditions and after the rotation has been established, complete loss
of the function will have little to no affect on the mission or personnel for the
remaining coast phase. However, as either the earth or Mars is approached,
the system is required to return to the zero-gravity mode because inability
to do so would be disastrous. A runaway jet would only increase the simu-
lated gravitational force. However, the larger gravitational forces could
exceed the design margin for the cables connecting the two spacecraft mod-
ules, but since it takes 3.6 hours to build up a force equivalent to the
earth's gravitational force, there is enough time to take Whatever comPen-
sating actions are necessary. Further, during the final phases of the
mission, the fuel reserve will be reduced considerably resulting in
expenditure prior to over stressing the extension system.
3.4 SPACECRAFT VELOCITY CONTROL - A PROFILE CONSTRAINT
Midcourse Corrections are normally required at some time after
transplanetary injection, and prior to arrival at periplanet. Loss of sub-
system functions which preclude the course correction at a specific point in
time. may not be very critical if it can be returned to operational status. The
data resulting from several studies and the Mariner program indicate that it
could be deferred for up to I00 days. (See data in Figure 3.3.) These curves
are representative of many of the flyby missions. The fuel penalties are
expected to be less than 150 feet per second.
Periplanet Corrections are those made while approaching the maximum
influence of the planet (point of closest proximity). The timing of this
activity is most critical. As shown in Figure 3.4, this AV correction must
be made within about 7 hours to take maximum advantage of the velocity
vector provided by the planet's gravitational field. Failure to make the
approach correction will result in probable loss of the mission since the
chance of a rendezvous with earth will be considerably lessened. Making it
too early, prior to T - i0, may result in too large an error and required a
second AV application.
Earth Approach Velocity Corrections are those made as though space-
craft enters the earth's sphere of influence, before establishing its position
relevant to the reentry corridor. This is an activity which is also critical
to a degree in that it must be performed; however, there are about fifteen
hours during which the task could be performed without appreciable penalty.
Failure to make the correction could easily result in passing earth or burning
up on reentry.
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Table 3.2 Velocity Control Downtime Constraints Summary
Mission Phase
i. Midcour se
2. Midcour se corrections
3. Planet approach
4. Earth approach
5. Earth retro maneuver
Downtime Constraint
(Hour s)
(Duration)
Z400
7.0
15.0
0.25
Constraining Factor
Function not required
Application of a Midcourse
A_ and associated fuel
Application of periplanet
A_7 correction for
proper return vector
Application of approach
AV correction to estab-
lish correct arrival
vector
Retro must be initiated as
Close to a point 21 min-
utes prior to 400,000 feet
as possible.
Earth Retro Maneuver is required about 400,000 feet above the surface
as the spacecraft approaches the earth's atmosphere. The retro force is
most efficient if it is tuade close to tile start of sensible atmosphere. But
enough tin]e n_ust be allowed to jettison the propulsion module and reorient
the reentry Command Module for the reentry phase. It is estimated that
seven to ten n_inutes are required to establish the desired attitude with
respect to the entry corridor. Thus, fifteen minutes has been allowed for
this operation. In addition, the retro burn will take from five to six minutes.
As a result of these requirements, the retro should start at atmospheric
entry minus twenty-one n]inutes. For safety sake it could be initiated earlier
and delayed somewhat later with sonde associated penalties in fuel and risk.
Therefore, it is estin]ated that a 15-minute period exists where the retro
could be initiated.
Earth Entry phase requires the uninterrupted operation of all associ-
ated systen_ function; thus, a very narrow corridor must be acquired and
maintained by constant vernier control. Any downtinue on the part of any
associated function could easily result in disaster.
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3.5 ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONSTRAINTS
Atmospheric pressure is required to make the spacecraft habitable to
man. Pressure below about 3.0 psia will eventually result in death because
body fluids vaporize at pressures below about 1. 5 psia. The minimum safe
boundary is therefore about 3.0 psia; however, at this pressure, man must
be provided pure oxygen for breathing. Limited exposure to vacuum may be
possible, according to U.S. Air Force tests.
Failures in, or loss of the atmospheric control system are covered
under either the N2 or 02 subfunctions. However, an additional failure mode
constraint is created by the potential rapid decompression hazard. This
hazard is created by a large meteoroid impingement or by the blow-out of
some form of access hatch or relief system which results in inadvertent
release of cabin pressure.
Under any of these failure modes, the time to catastrophy cannot be
rigidly set at any specific value since it is a direct function of hole size.
This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 3.5, where the time relationship
for hole size and decompression time is estimated. However, since the Mars
mission spacecraft cabin colume has been estimated from present and former
studies as between 2400 and 4500 cubic feet, one boundary can thus be esti-
mated. In addition, the upper boundary {0. 999 probability of one, or less than
a one-inch hole} can be estimated. From these data, it can be stated with
reasonable assurance that the safe time constraint is not less than about
7ZO seconds for a 400 ft3 cabin.
These data are replotted in Figure 3.6 to express the time and hole-
size relationship for the probable Mars Cabins.
3.6 OXYGEN SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
The oxygen system is designed to provide for the metabolic needs of
the astronauts. In addition, the system provides a portion of the atmospheric
pressure. For the flyby mission, Oz will probably be mixed on a 50/50 basis
with nitrogen which is to be used as a dilutent. The total pressure is nor-
mally expected to be 7 psia, and the oxygen partial pressure about 3. 5 psia.
Loss of the oxygen system functions can result in loss of the balance
control between 02 and N2, or, it can result in the inability to feed 02 to the
cabin and/or crew. Both of these factors impose potential constraints on the
allowable time the functions can be inoperative.
Loss of 02 balance or regulation can cause the 02 partial pressure to
either increase or decrease with respect to the total cabin content. Man is
very flexible in his tolerance to wide variations in 02 partial pressure as
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Figure 3.5.
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shown by the data in Figure 3. 7. Therefore, if the pressure builds up within
the cabin, the crew is safe for at least 24 hours at a pressure nearly 40 psia
and a 50/50 mixture, before performance degrades due to oxygen toxicity. If
the partial pressure (or mixture ratio) changes, it could increase to
100-percent 02 and remain there indefinitely if the total pressure is held
below about 7 psia.
Since a failure in the mixture control will not affect the volume of N 2
present, the 02 partial pressure would probably progress as shown by the
O2-overpressure curve. Under these conditions, a form of O z flooding, the
concentration could be raised by a factor of over 5 to a pressure of over
21 psia (85 percent 02 by volume) and the crew would survive for over
Z4 hours without noticeable degradation in normal performance. Over-
exercise may result in mild toxity earlier.
Loss of the O 2 feed system where the O 2is not replenished would seem
more hazardous, but the data does not support this position. If it is assumed
that the cabin air consisted of about 50-percent 02 and 50-percent N 2 at the
time the loss occurred; and further, that the cabin volume was between
700 cubic feet per man (2800 ft 3 total) and the 4510 cubic feet free volume
projected for the Mars Flyby Spacecraft (Kef. 1. 1), the situation would
progress as depicted in Figure 3.8. These data were based on the following
assumptions as projected for the Mars Flyby Mission:
. The leakage ratio is about 1. 1 cubic feet per hour at 7.0 psia, or
about 3.55 pounds per day.
2e Metabolic consumption is about O. 74 cubic feet per hour at
7.0 psia for each crew member.
. There were four crew members working at a normal rate and
under normal temperature.
. Hypoxia sets in at an 0 2 partial pressure, below about 2.8 psia,
or after a 20-percent reduction in the available O Z under the
50/50 mixture at 7 psia.
These data indicate that the 02 feed system could be inoperative and
down for repair for a period between 150 and 225 hours, depending on the
cabin size. This could be reduced by such factors as higher leak rates,
increased work activity, and high temperatures. But, it could be increased
if the CO 2 removal system continued to operate and/or the emergency
supplies were used.
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Figure 3.8. Effects of Loss of Oxygen System on Remaining Partial
Pressure and Crew Safety
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3. 7 NITROGEN SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS
The nitrogen gas is used as an atmospheric dilutent. In the systems
proposed for planetary flyby missions, nitrogen is mixed at about 50/50 with
the 02 supply at a pressure of 7.0 pounds. If a failure occurs in the N 2 sys-
ten_ where it will no longer provide the dilutent, the gas will eventually leak
out at a rate estimated to be about 4. 29 pounds per day.
The question of tolerance to the N 2 system outage is not clear cut.
Without replenishing, it will gradually be lost through leaks, at a rate
approxin]ated by Figure 3. 9. It could also be made up by building up the 0 2
partial pressure at an equivalent rate as shown. A second alternative is to
allow the total pressure to drip as N2 leaks out. If it all leaked out, the
resulting pressure (constant tenaperature) would be 3.5 psia-the lower safe
limit. However, a better alternative is to plan starting the 02 makeup at an
absolute pressure'of about 5 psia, as depicted in the center curve to minimize
the total 02 loss.
Under any of these circumstances, the allowable downtime would be no
less than about 1360 hours, constrained by the allowable 02 loss only.
3.8 CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS
The carbon dioxide (CO2) system functions to remove the CO 2 from the
cabin atniosphere and to keep it below a partial pressure of 4 millimeters of
mercury or 0. ii percent by volume. The normal atmosphere contains only
about 0.03 percent. Man's average daily output is between i. 76 pounds or
0.6 1 cubic feet per hour, and 2.25 pounds per hour, due to normal metabolic
functions. Under stress and high activity, this will increase considerably.
Extensive tests and operational situations have provided data which
relates n_an's perforn_ance under various conditions and CO 2 concentrations.
There seen_s to be no sharp line between the safe zone and a fatal dose.
Rather, perforn_ance is gradually degraded until the crewman becomes
unconscious and eventually dies, perhaps due to other allied causes.
The problems associated with loss of the CO 2 reduction system functions
and the subsequent buildup are related in Figure 3. I0 where the buildup rate
and the critical points are estin_ated for both the 700-cubic-foot-per-man
spacecraft and the Mars flyby spacecraft (4510 cubic feet free volume). These
data are based on the higher buildup rate (2. 25 pounds per hour), an esti-
nlated cabin leak rate of i. 0 pounds per day, and an an_bient temperature of
75 F. In addition, the cabin atn_ospheric content was about 50/50 of O2 and
N2, with between 3.5 and 4.0 nn_ of Hg of CO 2.
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The data indicate that the complete CO 2 removal function can be out of
service for up to 136 hours with little perceptible degradation in performance,
even in the smaller 700-cubic-foot-per-man cabin. After this, the crew
members would probably develop headaches and slowly become less and less
efficient. After about 300 hours they may become unconscious and eventually
die. Therefore, it can be said that a reasonable downtime constraint for the
CO 2 removal function need not be any less than the 136 hours, and could
possibly be 220 hours, depending on the final free volume of the mission mod-
ule and its associated leak rate.
3.9 TRACE CONTAMINANT CONTROL CONSTRAINTS
Trace contaminants are manifest in the form of gases, vapors, aero-
sols and particulates, and they stem from two major sources --the equipment
within the spacecraft, and the human body. The body is considered the
greatest source of these contaminants via the metabolic process. Under
actual tests, approximately 100 contaminants have been isolated within the
spacecraft cabin, but neither the buildup rate or the toxicity of the individual
contributants have been identified.
If the trace contaminant removal function fails and is down for any
length of time, they will probably reach a point of equilibrium, probably above
the toxic level. However, the buildup rate is known to be so low that, with
caution in the material selection, it will take days for the levels to reach a
toxic state. It is most certainly expected to be less than that associated with
CO 2 removal, which can therefore provide an estimate of the lower boundary,
approximately 1 36 hours.
3. i0 TEMPERATURE CONTROL CONSTRAINTS - EQUIPMENT
The equipment temperature control function is required to provide
coolant through equipment heat sinks in the form of cold plates, and to remove
the excess heat produced by a nuclear or radio" isotope electrical power
source. Of the two functions, the power-source cooling is most critical and
will probably form the limiting case. Since most designs presently con-
sidered provide a separate cooling loop for the isotope power source, this
will be assumed to be true for this analysis, with both treated as two loops,
and therefore, as two separate constraints.
3. 10. 1 The isotope coolant loop is most sensitive to cooling system outages.
Since the power conversion systems used in conjunction with the isotopic
sources are not very efficient and vary between 18 to 27 percent, the
remaining heat generated must be dissipated. All extended mission plans
project the use of a space radiator and an associated active coolant loop for
this purpose. In addition, and because the active cooling is lost prior to the
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reentry phase, alarge heat sink is provided to absorb the heat during this
phase and up to splash down. At that time, the compartment is flooded with
sea water for cooling, until it can be deactivated.
Two or three basic conversions with widely varying efficiencies are
under consideration. Each system design will have a heat sink designed to
limit the isotope capsule to about 2200 F, 66 minutes after loss of the normal
cooling loop. The capsule time - temperature history of the Brayton and
Mercury Rankine systems are shown along with a typical heat sink
(beryllium) in Figure 3. Ii. Most isotope heat sinks will probably be sized
to reach the 2200 F in no less than 66 minutes. However, because of the
inherent design margin, the ten_perature could continue to rise for about
another 14 n_inutes for a total of 80 minutes. The heat sinl_ will melt within
the next 10 minutes if the coolant loop is not restored to operation. The
maxin_um downtime for the isotope cooling loop lies therefore between 66 and
80 minutes.
3. 10.2 Ten_perature and Hu1_lidity Constraints - Personnel Imposed
The cabin temperature and humidity are controlled to assure a habitable
and comfortable environn_ent for the crew. Further, since crew performance
is affected by these factors, they are regulated to achieve an optimum
envirorm_ent conducive to peak crew efficiency. Factors which affect the
temperature and therefore the relative humidity are:
I. Each crew member produces an average of ii, 200 Btu's per day.
. Heat lost through the walk of the spacecraft, as estimated in a
former study, (Ref i. l) was about 5, 320 Btu per hour at 1.52 au
(Mars vicinity) and 2, 870 per hour at 0. 58 au.
. Heat may be gained from radiant energy of the sun which varies
drastically with spacecraft orientation and distance from the sun.
Data in (2.) assun_cs a ratio of 3 to 1 of the exterior surface
exposed to space versus that exposed to direct solar radiation.
In emergencies, this n_ay be changed to a degree by reorienting
the spacecraft.
The data indicates that cabin temperature is quite sensitive to the loss
of the air-control function. A total of about 9551 Btu's is being introduced
into the cabin every hour by the mission systen_ equipn_ent alone. This,
added to the 1870 Btu produced by the crew, would elevate the cabin air by
37 F per hour at 1.52 au and up to 51 F per hour at 0. 58 au without the
cooling function. These represent the extren_e cases resulting from being in
farthest or closest proximity with respect to the sun at the tinge the loss
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Figure 3.11. Temperature History for Isotopic Power Sources After
Loss of Cooling Loop Function
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occurs. The most likely value is therefore somewhere between both extremes.
These boundaries, along with the results of various other intermediate con-
ditions, are plotted as a function of time in Figure 3. 12.
The analysis indicates that a minimum of only one hour is available for
repairs that affect cabin cooling if, and only if, all other equipment is
operated normally. About three hours is available if only the environmental
and life support system functions are operated. Notice that thermal equi,
librium can be maintained at the point closest to the sun, for a nearly
indefinite period of time by just operating the two cabin air fans. Manual
control can be achieved by operating the required equipments in a cyclic
fashion. Therefore, because of the wide latitude of manual control available
to the crew, the resulting downtime constraint is not less than one hour and
could be extended to almost any reasonable length of time - certainly over
24 hours.
Because of a potential humidity condensate problem, a major consid-
eration is the need to sustain in operation the temperature and the humidity
control function.
3. 11 HUMIDITY CONTROL CONSTRAINTS
Humidity control and atmospheric temperatures are directly related.
Humidity condensate in the air, walls, or equipment, could be very deleterious
to total mission. For that reason, close control is required. The design
goal is to maintain humidity between 35 and 75 percent. Since each man
exhausts 3.75 pounds per day into the air, the concentration will build up
rapidly if the dehumidifier is out of service.
Figure 3. 13 presents the cabin atmospheric humidity condition as a
function of time for the 700 ft3-per-man-volume and the proposed 4510 ft3
Mars flyby cabin. Since the humidity can be anywhere between 35 and 75 per-
cent at the start, the potential available downtime is a variable resulting
from these two extremes. The dehumidifier may work in cycles starting up
at 75 percent, and stopping at 35 percent. If this is the case, initial con-
ditions at failure can be anywhere, in between, on a random basis. Under no
conditions should the atmosphere be allowed to achieve i00 percent humidity.
The temperature can be assumed to hold comparatively constant at 70 F and
the cabin pressure at about the 7 psia.
Given the preceding conditions, the allowable downtime for the 700 ft3
could be as low as 1.6 hours, but no more than 3.8 hours. For the 4-man
Mars flyby cabin this would be not less than 2.7 hours, or more than
6. l hours. By elevating the ambient temperature from l0 degrees to
80 degrees F, an additional 2. 7 hours can be added to any of the stated
values. However, since the starting point is randomly distributed, this is
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Figure 3.12. Cabin Air Temperature History as a Function of Spacecraft
Position and Systems Operating, After a Loss of
Temperature Control Function
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also true of the actual downtime constraint. Using the normal distribution,
the most likely value would be about 4.5 hours, or about 4.0 hours for
90-percent of the potential failure incidents.
By virtue of the foregoing reasoning, 4.0 hours is taken as the potential
downtime constraint for the humidity control function.
3.12 REFERENCES FOR DOWNTIME CONSTRAINTS
Ref. No.
3. 1 Bioastronautics Data Book, NASASP3006, 1964.
3.2 Preliminary Definition Phase Study Environmental Control System
Apollo Extension System, AiResearch Mfg. , SS-3942,
November 1965.
3.3 Analytical Methods for Space Vehicle Atmospheric Control
Processes, ASD Technical Report 61-162, Contract (AF 33 66 16)
-8323, July 1962
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IV. CREWMAN CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
4. 1 DATA, SCOPE,AND APPLICATION
For the crew to perform a given maintenance or repair task, it must
be shown that the associated subtasks are within his performance envelope,
in terms of the conditions under which the task must be accomplished. To
assure that these contingent conditions can be accommodated, the crewman's
performance envelope must be clearly defined for an T potential condition
a M&I_ task may be expected to impose. This section is devoted to defining
that envelope as far as the available data will permit.
A survey of data available on human strength capabilities disclose a
conspicuous lack of sound data which adequately define the effects of the
space enviromnent on man's ability to produce useful work. The force and
dexterity decrements resulting from the need to wear a full pressure suit
(pressurized or unpressurized), together with the reduced or zero-
gravitational forces can be significant. Considerable data does exist on the
force producing capability of various segments of the population under normal
conditions; that is, l-g and shirtsleeve environments. These data employ
body configurations and orientations which are typical for the performance of
tasks which were normal for the l-g condition, but may not prove optimum
for similar tasks in zero or reduced gravitational fields and or in a pressure
suit.
These data do provide a performance index which, through careful
application of the available space environment data, can provide boundaries
for the crew performance envelope under the expected working conditions.
An optimized restraint system, which will satisfy Newton's third law, can
facilitate application of nearly the same force vectors in reduced gravity as
under the l-g situation.
The data used in this section is the result of an extensive literature
search and studies conducted by the Life Sciences Group of S&ID. Much of
the data was derived from maintenance task simulation accomplished through
use of S&ID's six-degrees-of-freedom simulator, the lightest one in existence
at the time of this report (Figure 4. i). Much of the S&ID data has not yet
been reduced to report form.
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4. 2 FORCE PRODUCTION IN ONE G VERSUS ZERO G
The following data was derived through tests on man's capability to
perform work in the normal earth environment and under various positional
constraints. These values represent the upper limits of his work envelope.
They are nearly applicable to the zero-g spaceflight situation when:
io The worker is restrained in such a manner as to apply a reactive
forces vector equivalent to that of the earth's gravitational field.
The work is to be performed within a pressure shell where
sufficient atmospheric pressure can be supplied to permit working
in the equivalent of a shirtsleeve environment.
The data presented in Figures 4. 2 through 4. 7 are applicable to any
maintenance and/or repair operation that can be accomplished from a
seated or prone position without respect to gravitational force so long as
the worker is restraified by a simple belt across his loins. (Ref. 4. l).
Figures 4. Z and 4.3 present the measured mean arm strength ± one
standard deviation, at varying degrees of elbow flexion for a seated worker
in l-g or reduced gravity, with a conventional seat belt.
Figures 4.4 through 4.7 present the resulting mean arm strength,
± one standard deviation, at varying degrees of elbow flexing for an operator
in a prone position. The data G is for the one-g case, or, where the worker
is or restrained at the approximate c.g. by a simple strap.
Figures 4. 8 through 4. i0 present data derived from several S&ID and
Boeing studies (Ref. 4. 2). Figure 4.8 presents the derived workman capa-
bility to exert a torquing force on a control wheel and/or valve control as a
function of the working conditions, and the actuator wheel size. Note that
when the work surface is horizontal with respect to the worker, and at the
knees or below, he cannot produce any significantly useful work. In addition,
under the zero-g situation, it is impractical for the worker to attempt an
activity of this nature while the work surface is horizontal with respect to
his position, since he cannot apply an isometric force. This would change
with proper restraints, but his area of capability would be severely limited.
With the work surface vertical, or parallel with his body, he can be very
effective, although under zero g, one-half of the force would be required to
satisfy Newton's third law. The values are 10-percent less for counter-
clockwise motion.
Figure 9 presents the worker's torque producing capability through a
six-inch moment arm, equivalent to that of a six-inch ratchet wrench. Where
two hands can be used, the values may be increased by a factor of 2.
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Figure 4.2. Arm Strength at 1 G
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Figure 4.4. Arm Strength at l G
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Figure 4.6. Arm Strength at I G
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Figure 4.7. Arm Strength at I G
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Figure 4.9. Torque Producing Capability Through a Six-lnch Moment Arm,
as a Function of Work Relative Position
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The zero-g case is unrestrained and is the result of the need for an
isometric force. The resulting recommended design values are:
a. Restrained in zero g < Z4 foot pounds
b. Unrestrained in zero G < 18 foot pounds
Note: Hand-holds must be available in the appropriate
positions.
c. Two hands restrained <45 foot pounds
Figure 4. 10 presents the measured capability of a worker to produce
a translatory force as a function of various working conditions. In this case,
the lower boundary represents the mean one-hand value, and the upper
boundary is the mean two-hand value. In zero g, but restrained at the c. g.,
the force producing capability is reduced, but is higher than the chest or
head values. The wide variation displayed as a function of relative position
is attributed to the moment arm created by the distance from the anchor
point (the feet). The worker can push harder than he can pull. The resulting
values are:
a. Restrained in zero g < 60 pounds - push or pull
b. Unrestrained in zero g < 35 pounds - isometric
NOTE: Hand-hold or parallel surface required.
4.3 FORCE PRODUCTION IN REDUCED GRAVITY
During a major portion of the planetary missions, and perhaps the
longer earth orbital missions, the spacecraft will probably be operating in
an artificial gravity mode. Since this is true, and most of the maintenance
and repair actions will be performed Under these conditions, it is necessary
to identify workman's capability, unaided, under these conditions.
Figures 4. 11 and 4. 12 presents some applicable data from reference 4.3
as correlated with S&ID studies. The gravitational force simulated was about
1/6 of earth's force.
Figure 4. ii provides estimates of force'producing capabilities under
these conditions but for the work approximately parallel with the worker's
c.g. These data, when used as a correction factor in conjunction with that
of Section 4. 2 can provide values for any relative position.
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Figure 4. IZ presents the results of tests involving typical maintenance
and repair activities where gravity plays an important role in neutralizing
the reactive force vector. It is evident from these data that the worker
capability for all operations is substantially less in the reduced gravity
with the exception of lifting. Note that in contrast with the equivalent one-g
data, his capabilities to perform these tasks are reduced by over a factor
of three.
4. 4 THE TRACTIONLESS ENVIRONMENT (ZERO G)
• J '
The tractionless envlronment is that situation where the worker is not
under a direct or simulated gravitational force - he is essentially weightless.
In this mode his useful work output depends on his ability to apply an
isometric force, or take advantage of his moment of inertia (Ref. 4. Z).
Application of the isometric force satisfies Newton's third law, but, in so
doing, the useful work producing capability is reduced to less than one-half
(I/2) of the normal environment. This is made clear through the contrasting
data of section 4. 2.
Where the worker's moment of inertia is the only neutralizing reactant
for the force vector, little to no useful work can be performed even with
a non-isometric handhold. This is demonstrated by the S&ID data and that
taken from references 4. Z and 4.4. A sample test result is presented in
Figure 4. 13. The conclusions to be drawn from these data are summarized
by the word impractical. Work in the tractionless state is impractical
without the use of appropriate restraints which effectively neutralize the
reactive forces.
4. 5 DEXTERITY IMPEDIMENTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS
Dexterity impediments are a secondary effect created by the need to
work in the hostile environment known as "space." The need for maintenance
and repair activity, external to the spacecraft, is known to be low; that is,
less than five percent of the total expected load. This will probably be less
than one in any 90-day period; however, when required , it will probably be
a very essential operation to crew safety. For this reason a careful defini-
tion of the restraints resulting from the suited mode of operation is mandatory.
The dexterity impediments are created by the need for a pressurized suit.
Wearing a suit imposes decrements in:
a. Manual dexterity
b. Force values
e
P
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Figure 4. 11. Maximum Forces Exerted at I/6-G Without Loss of Footing
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Figure 4. lZo Force Requirements for Maintenance Operations at I/6-G
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c. Total work capability
d. Time required to accomplish a given task.
Table 4. 1 presents some of the result from Reference 4. Z, an evalua-
tion of man's capability to use specific tools, as a function of suit conditions.
In essence, it shows that in applying a torque through a screwdriver, it is
known the pressure suit reduces capability by only about 20 percent, yet,
his ability to grip pliers is reduced to almost 50 percent. Both values
assume that the task size is within the dexterity envelope of the suited
workman•
Figure 4. 14 presents some of the results from Reference 4.5 and
demonstrates the decrements introduced on force capability by the pressure
suit at 3 psig. A comparison of these data and those of Section 4. 2, the
unsuited case, indicate a suit decrement in the order of about 35 to 40 per-
cent for a given set of conditions.
Dexterity is a measure of the worker's ability to use his hands and
fingers in accomplishing relatively delicate operations. The worker's
manual dexterity is adversely affected by the relative inflexibility of the
existing pressure suits. This relative effect can be seen from Figure 4. 15,
which was prepared from data in Reference 4.6. It plots the number of fins
which can be placed in the Purdue pegboard with either hand, and both
within a 30-second time interval• The lower line denotes the worker's ability
to complete the indicated number of assembly operations within a sixty-
second interval. The data presented indicates a considerable decrement in
refined finger and hand dexterity results from use of a pressurized suit.
The test can be roughly construed as being analogous to activities requiring
the handling of small piece parts, such as nuts and bolts associated with
typical assembly and disassembly tasks. These data indicate that the parts
handled must be much larger than normal, and more clearance between each
part/operation is required. Further, more time must be allowed for each
discrete task.
4. 6 TASK TIME DECREMENTS
Figure 4. 16 presents a composite of some results derived from S&ID
tests and those in Reference 4.7. The results of these sources seem to
correlate within acceptable experimental error. These data indicate that
the impediments imposed by suited activities impose a very noticeable
decrement in the time required to accomplish a given task. A full-pressure
suit will probably increase a given task time by a factor of 2.6, or to as
much as 260 percent of the normal time.
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Zero g is not expected to adversely affect task time after adequate
training. These same data sources indicate that after between 15 to 20
repetitions of a given task in zero g, the time required to perform the
operation levels out at nearly the same value required on earth, all other
conditions being the same.
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